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OF INJUSTICE. By-Edmond N. Cahn. New York: New York University Press. 1949. Pp. 186. $3.50.
Edmond Cahn is a Professor of Law at New York University. He has styled
his book "An Anthropocentric View of Law," that is, one which assumes man as
the center or ultimate end and which interprets law in terms of man or the human
mind. The reader should not be intimidated by the imposing subtitle, however, for
he will find that Professor Cahn presents a refreshingly novel approach to legal
philosophy. Written with intelligence and tolerance, the book adequately relates
legal concepts and abstractions to their practical application by man and upon man.
The author has divided his study of legal theory into three parts, in each of which
he examines one of the following antitheses: Justice and Power, Freedom and
Order, Security and Change. In the first of these, justice is defined as an active
process, freed of mere static contemplativeness, that remedies or prevents that
which would arouse a sense of injustice in man. The sense of injustice is a biologic reaction which combines both reason and the projection of one's self into others, manifesting itself by demanding equality, the preservation of human dignity,
conscientious adjudication, the fulfillment of -eommon expectations, and confinement of g6vemmen"t to its proper functions. In the succeeding sections, the author
develops his thesis that the sense of injustice forms the basis of our juridic world.
No claim is made that this combination of reason and empathy is infallible or that
it is the only factor which controls the formulation of law. Author Cahn convincingly demonstrates, however, that it has a broad influence on the shaping of both
speofic judgments and general law in promotion of the ultimate realization of
justice through law.

